Contributory negligence

In order that a man;s negligence may entitle another to remedy against him, that other must have suffered harm whereof this negligence was a proximate cause. Now I may be negligent, and my negligence may be the occasion of some one suffering harm, and yet the immediate cause of the damage may be not want of care but his own. Had I been careful to begin with, he would not have been in danger, but had he being so put in danger, used reasonable care for his own safety or that of his property, the damage would still not have happened. Thus may original negligence is a comparatively remote cause of the harm, and as things turn out, the proximate cause is the sufferer's own fault, or rather he cannot ascribe it to the fruit of another.  In a state of facts answering this general description, the person harmed is by the rule of the common law not entitled to any remedy. He is said to be guilty of contributory negligence.  Pollock on Torts.

If the plaintiff so far contributed to the damage by this own want of ordinary care and caution, that, but for such negligence or want of care, the misfortune would not have dis-entitle the plaintiff, unless by the exercise of ordinary care the might have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence; of if the defendant might by the exercise of caution on his part, have avoided the consequences of the neglect or carelessness of  the plaintiff. Thus if the plaintiff has wrongly or negligently left his cattle or goods on the road, the defendant may not drive over them, if by care, he might doing so.  The doctrine of contributory negligence is really another form of the doctrine that the defendant's negligence must be the proximate, and not a remote, cause of the injury, Where the plaintiff is not himself in any fault, but the injury to him arises from the combined or contributory negligence of two separate employed to do separate thing, the plaintiff may sure either or both.